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1. The  Issue 
Institutions are constraints, rational choice institutionalists say (e.g. Furubotn and Richter 1997). 
Institutions are social constructions, holistic institutionalists say (e.g. March and Olsen 1989). 
Try to use either of these major concepts of an institution to understand why we have driver's 
licences. Of course, you may be fined if stopped by the police and not in possession of your 
driver's license. Yet this constraint is but one element of a much richer institutional arrangement. 
And while hardly anybody would quarrel with the obligation of all drivers to go to driving 
school, the effect of this institution on social construction also only scratches the surface.  
Admittedly, there are many more attempts at defining institutions, and at explaining their social 
function (Hodgson 1988; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Rutherford 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996; 
DiMaggio 1998; Nee 1998; Peters 1999; Mantzavinos 2001; Ostrom 2005; Hodgson 2006). One 
class of them is much better prepared to address the driving school example, namely those that 
link institutions to habit formation (Veblen 1898; Langlois 1998; Loasby 1999:chapter 3; Noote-
boom and Bogenrieder 2003; Hodgson 2004). The existence of habits and the ability of institu-
tions to shape habits is indeed central to the conceptual framework for the effect of institutions 
described in this paper, though the framework is not confined to habits. It invites institutionalists 
to consider not simply the effect(s) of institutions (like mandatory driving school) on observable 
behaviour, but to also see them as ways of shaping the processes by which individuals subjected 
to those institutions decide on or generate behaviour.  
Whether by design or incidentally, institutions serve a purpose. Driving school serves at least 
four of them simultaneously. Untrained drivers pose a risk to other drivers, bystanders and pas-
sengers. Training thus reduces negative externalities. Schooling also makes it less likely that 
drivers injure themselves or damage their own car. The requirement of a driving license thus has 
a paternalistic dimension. Moreover, standardised training makes drivers predictable. One need 
for instance not be afraid that those coming from the other side of the junction will ignore the red 
traffic light. Thereby local interaction is facilitated. Finally, learners are also taught to be respon-
sive to traffic lights, traffic signs and the orders of policemen. That way, driving school increases 
what Lawrence Lessig has dubbed regulability (Lessig 1999). 
These four outcomes are the ultimate goals of regulating driver competence. To reach these ulti-
mate goals, the regulator must attain two proximate goals. New drivers must be endowed with 
the socially desirable set of driving routines, and they must be induced to use them whenever 
they get on the road. Driving a car is a complex task. Drivers must know how to physically han-
dle the car while properly responding to the features of the road and, most importantly, the be-
haviour of other drivers. A mere legal obligation to drive “adequately” would not produce the 
desired behaviour, no matter how serious the sanction attached to its violation. Only after they 
have built the appropriate habits, are drivers able to behave as necessary for street safety.  
To bring this result about, the legal system needs an entire institutional arrangement. There is 
indeed a sanction, as required by the rational choice approach to institutions, as a policeman has   2
power to fine any driver unable to produce a valid driver’s license. This ensures that future driv-
ers first go to driving school and pass a driving test. The actual training is a mixture of theory 
and practice under the supervision of a driving instructor. Part of the training is learning a large 
set of cues, ranging from the stoplights of other cars and oil on the street to a wide range of traf-
fic signs, as well as the appropriate behaviour in different situations. The associations between 
environmental cues and appropriate behaviour are repeatedly practiced, until they are sufficiently 
automatised. 
The example illustrates our message to institutional analysts  and designers. Institutions are fre-
quently unable to immediately and directly reach their ultimate goal of moving the behaviour of 
its addressees into a socially desired direction. They can only do so if they first reach the proxi-
mate goal of changing their addressees’ decision how to decide. Even in situations where institu-
tional designers could directly target behaviour by just one intervention, e.g. through ostensibly 
raising stakes, they may prefer this more indirect approach. The addressees’ decision how to de-
cide thus constitutes an independent access point for institutional intervention. Moreover it pro-
vides institutional designers with an opportunity for time shifting. They may impact on the ad-
dressees’ repertoire of techniques for decision-making long before they take the first socially 
relevant decision in a domain. This may be desirable since intervention at the moment when a 
change in behaviour is needed may entail a larger opportunity cost for either the regulator or the 
addressee. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly describes psychological 
research on multiple modes of decision making that is the starting point for the model offered in 
the current paper.  Section 3 develops an informal model of multiple modes of problem-solving 
and their selection in any given situation. Based on this model, Section 4 characterises access 
points for institutional intervention into the decision how to decide or how to solve a problem. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Deciding how to Decide: Multiple Modes of Making Decisions 
Changing the addressees’ decision how to decide only makes sense if individuals possess more 
than one mental tool for the purpose. This is indeed the case. Table 1 summarizes the taxonomy 
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Mode Sub  Type  Inputs  Processes  Motivational  Focus 
calculation cost-benefit  • attributes 
• probabilities 




recognition case-based  holistic  situations  • pattern  matching 
•  execution of if-then 
 productions 
• technical   
 efficiency 
• accuracy 
 rule-based  situational  ele-
ments that trigger 
rule 
• explicit  category- 
 sation 
•  execution of if-then 
 productions 




• self  control 
 role-based  situational   
elements relevant 
to social role 
•  recognition of role-
 related  expectations 
• execution 
• connectedness 
• social  identity 
• self-esteem 




 (classic  conditioning) 
•  learned approach or 
 avoidance  response 
 (operant  conditioning) 







The taxonomy distinguishes three classes of decision modes: calculation-based, affect-based, and 
recognition-based decisions, captured colloquially as decisions made by the head, by the heart, 
and by the book.  The three classes of decision modes differ in the situational inputs and the psy-
chological processes they utilize. Calculation-based decisions involve analytical thought. Affect-
based decisions are based on immediate, holistic, affective reaction (Epstein 1994; Damasio 
2000). In recognition-based decision-making, the decision-maker recognises the situation as a 
member of a class for which a satisfactory action is known (Simon 1990).  
Recognition-based decisions come in different variants.  In case-based decisions, the decision-
maker is typically an expert in the decision domain, with a memory store of specific decision 
situations and their appropriate associated actions.  These mental representations can be thought 
of as IF-THEN productions, where the IF element is a set of conditions that must be met in order 
to trigger the resultant action represented by the THEN part of the production.  The expert deci-
sion-maker is able to unconsciously apply these production rules that have been developed 
through repeated experience, as demonstrated by (Klein 1998) with experts such as firefighters 
and jet pilots. 
Another type of recognition-based decisions are rule-based decisions.  These rules may be laws 
(IF you are driving and come to a red light, THEN you must stop) or other types of regulations 
(parental rules, selfimposed admonishments, societal norms, or company rules) (Prelec and 
Herrnstein 1991). In role-based decisions, the decision context elicits a rule of conduct that de-
rives from a social role of the decision-maker (March and Heath 1994). As a mother, IF your 
child is very ill, THEN you must stay home and care for him.   4
(Weber 1998; Weber and Lindemann 2007) propose that these different modes of making deci-
sions coexist because each mode is better suited than others to address different human needs 
and motives. Calculation-based modes are best suited to maximize material consequences. 
Someone wanting to justify her decisions to a supervisor would be well-served by making her 
decision in a rule-based fashion. Role-based decisions serve to satisfy the motives of connected-
ness and affiliation. The need for autonomy may be best met by using an affect-based decision 
mode, as a way of affirming that one’s personal desire for an action suffices. 
Multiple modes of processing have been well documented for a wide variety of tasks.  The 
(Payne, Bettman et al. 1988; Payne, Bettman et al. 1993) adaptive decision maker program 
showed that people strategically employ a wide range of decision strategies in the context of 
multi-attribute choice (e.g., which car to purchase). More recent work has demonstrated the stra-
tegic use of a toolbox of strategies in inference tasks (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) and for deci-
sion mode selection (Weber and Hsee 2000; Weber, Ames et al. 2004). The idea of a plurality of 
mental tools is also captured by dual process theories (Evans and Over 1997; Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Stanovich and West 2000; Bohner 2001). These models claim that the human mind has 
two processing modes, one more analytic and reflective, the other more automatic and impulsive, 
that operate in parallel and can both compete and cooperate with each other (Strack and Deutsch 
2002).  
The agenda of this paper goes beyond previous psychological research in its assumptions about 
the social context of decisions and actions. Exceptions like (Bandura 1986) notwithstanding, 
psychological studies typically concentrate on behaviour in standardised contexts. In reality 
however, context is often shaped or even provided by institutions. Another shortcoming of the 
adaptive theory of decision mode selection is that it addresses the implicit selection of one or 
more ways of deciding between a set of choice options, rather than the more ill-defined situa-
tions more commonly encountered outside of the laboratory that are better described as problem 
solving tasks. When describing the work of managers, scientists, engineers, or lawyers, (Simon 
1986) distinguished between decision making and problem solving in the following way. He re-
ferred to the activities of fixing agendas, setting goals, and designing actions as problem solving, 
and to activities of evaluating and choosing between alternative actions as decision making.  
There are some precursors, though none very close, to the goal of the present paper to understand 
how institutions affect and influence the mental processes by which behaviour is generated. 
Closest in intention and coverage is work that explores the interaction between institutions and 
behaviour not generated by deliberate reasoning, with a focus primarily on routines or habits 
(James 1893:143; Veblen 1898:390; Hodgson 1988:123-134; Vanberg 2002; Hodgson 2004). 
The legal literature on addiction normally takes it as a given that institutions must step in to 
overcome socially or individually detrimental decision modes without being concerned about 
how this is or can be done; a symposium bringing psychologists and legal philosophers together 
on this topic has been an interesting exception (Corrado 1999). Recently, there has also been in-
terest in the interaction between heuristic decision making and the law (Gigerenzer and Engel 
2006), and in institutional interventions that increase predictability. Predicting the behaviour of   5
an interaction partner is difficult precisely because the human mind is not just one general prob-
lem solving machine. Not the least reason for this is the plurality of decision modes (Engel 
2005). The literature on heuristics and biases, with recommendations for debiasing  (for a sum-
mary account see Jolls and Sunstein 2006) also considers a related issue, but typically focuses on 
the direct effect of institutions on behaviour, not on the more indirect strategy of targeting the 
mental mechanism by which this behaviour is generated.  
3.  A Model of Problem Solving Modes 
a) The  Basic  Model 
Models cannot be right or wrong. A model is good if it has high explanatory or predictive power. 
The benchmark for evaluating the utility of a model thus depends on the research question. The 
question explored in this paper is how institutions impact on the decision how to decide. For in-
stitutional designers this is, however, only the proximate goal. We need a model that links this 
proximate goal to the ultimate goal of changing behaviour such that social betterment is 
achieved. Our model may therefore not be confined to what happens inside the mind. It must link 










Problem Solving Model 
 
Individuals rely on problem solving modes when faced with a decision task. While the problem 
solving mode used in a given situation may be designed on the spot, we assume that it is usually 
preconfigured. (See Table 2 below for some illustrations.) If so, the decision how to solve the 
problem at hand converts into choosing an appropriate mode from the stock of problem solving 
modes. Problem solving modes rely on processing modules. Standard modules are informational 
input, the design of a response, and the generation of an output. Each of the modules has re-
course to appropriate resources for fulfilling its functional task. For instance, if information is   6
visual, the eye and brain regions needed for processing the sensory input are activated to trans-
late the picture on the retina into meaningful information about the environment. 
Not all problem tasks are equal. If you spot a poisonous snake twenty yards away, being fast is 
paramount. If your boyfriend has proposed to you, a spontaneous yes with a happy smile is good 
policy – but only if you have been waiting for the proposal anyhow; otherwise some careful de-
liberation whether this is the right companion for the rest of your life is in order. Consequently, 
appropriate problem solving modes selectively draw on input, processing, and output modules, in 
light of the features of the task at hand. The problem solving mode thus is the link between capa-
bilities and tasks. 
b) Resources 
Resources are listed as a separate component in our model since they need not be internal. Tech-
nical progress has left not a single internal resource without an external substitute. Moreover, 
external resources often are not just substitutes but superior to internal resources. An obvious 
example is the addition of large numbers, where a calculator will outperform the human brain in 
both speed and reliability. Normally, internal and external resources have their comparative 
strengths and weaknesses. A computer may have higher storage capacity than human memory, 
but is worse at reconfiguring its stock of knowledge according to changes in interest or in the 
environment.  
There are two principal sources of external resources: technology and people. Technical re-
sources that facilitate decision-making or problem solving are as old as writing and printing. 
Four eyes see more than two, and experts can bring their specialized knowledge and professional 
experience to a task. Groups are able to exploit the power of averaging out random error if each 
member reports an independent observation. Organised groups can extend the gains from spe-
cialisation to task specific interaction. 
c) Processing  Modules 
While there are a great variety of internal and external resources, the number of processing mod-
ules is strictly confined. Figure 2 provides a complete list. 
   7







Input from the environment is mentally processed in the light of a goal to generate an output. 
Optionally, feedback informs the individual about consequences resulting from the output.  
The operation of each of these modules has a wide range.  At their very basic, an individual 
hears the horn of a car and jumps to the sidewalk. One piece of sound triggers the simple deci-
sion rule “flee to safety,” which the individual executes on the spot. At the opposite end of the 
range of complexity, an individual may read in the newspaper that, due to demographic change, 
the pay-as-you-go pension system is no longer sustainable. This piece of information induces the 
individual to consider alternative sources of a retirement income. She consults some of the rele-
vant literature, asks the works council about the pension plan of her company, and calculates her 
freely available income. With this information in mind, she gains an understanding of the prob-
lem of intertemporal choice she faces. How much consumption today is she willing to sacrifice 
for greater comfort after retirement? How long is she likely to earn a regular income? How long 
will she live? Is it important that her children inherit a fortune? How should today's savings be 
best invested? She thus goes through a complex process of generating further input and produc-
ing the criteria that ultimately direct her choice of alternative investments.  
d) Tasks 
Ultimately, institutional designers are not interested in how a decision maker approaches and 
solves a problem or makes a decision, but instead in the socially relevant behaviour that results 
from this meta-decision. Our model therefore has a task component.  
This component borrows from political science. For a much more aggregate actor, namely the 
legislator, political science faces the same conceptual challenge. It must single out the necessary 
components of the decision-making process. The tool for doing this is called the policy cycle. 
While there are many versions of this cycle, a fairly stylised version (May and Wildavsky 1978) 
has stood the test of time and lends itself to the analogy with individual decision makers in which 
we are interested. Figure 3 translates it into what we call the problem solving cycle. 
 










Problem Solving Cycle 
 
The cycle starts on the top, with task selection. On a normal day, an individual has to make hun-
dreds, if not thousands of decisions. Should I turn right or left on my way to the train station? 
Should I help myself to another cup of coffee? Should I speak up at the business meeting? 
Should I prepare for tomorrow’s lesson? Should I have an argument with my neighbour? Should 
I prolong the contract with the gym? Should I buy a new car? Should I accept the offer for a new 
job? Should I undergo elective surgery? Should I break up with my partner? Even with the help 
of external resources, considering all of them immediately can be beyond the individual’s capac-
ity. If so, the individual must engage in task selection. 
The shorthand for task selection is the question: Which of the many issues deserving of my at-
tention should I consider at this point in time? This decision is influenced by both the situation I 
currently find myself in and by my values, needs, and goals. But what exactly is "this issue"? 
Often, at the beginning this is far from clear. Since problem definition therefore is not merely a 
mechanical affair, the model speaks of task construction. Is there a choice between exogenously 
specified alternatives, or is the solution space open? What are the relevant constraints? Is there a 
benchmark for a good solution, or is defining a benchmark part of the task? Are the relevant 
facts known or at least knowable, or must the decision be taken under uncertainty? Task con-
struction need not be dictated by the environment. Due to the severe limitations on logical rea-
soning, individuals often construct as a decision under uncertainty what might be solved logi-
cally (Oaksford and Chater 1994). For instance, in situations of strategic interaction, they do not 
calculate through complex game trees, but simply ask: is this person trustworthy? This ability to 
construct the task in different, and often simpler ways makes it possible to rely on simple heuris-
tics for decision-making (Gigerenzer, Todd et al. 1999). 
Once the task has been construed, the decision maker is left with three questions: is the issue 
worth producing any output at all? If so, what are the available options? Which of these options   9
is to be preferred? Answering these three questions is what we call the definition of the solution. 
At this stage, the individual must define the output space. Often she is not confined to choosing 
among preconfigured options, but can use her creativity. In assessing the options, she needs a 
normative benchmark. Again, this is not necessarily a given. Often the individual is able to 
change the benchmark in light of the task at hand (Klein 1998). 
The reason for making execution a separate element of the model is the possibility to entrust 
execution to external resources. Relying on technology for execution has become ubiquitous. 
Whenever the individual does not physically execute the decision, there is the same potential of 
an implementation deficit that has kept political scientists busy for decades (Winter 1975; 
Mayntz 1980). There also are implementation deficits of a psychological nature, as discussed by 
(Gollwitzer and Schaal 1998). 
While outcome evaluation is not always sought, because negative evaluations reflect badly on 
the problem solver and might reduce his external standing and self-esteem, evaluation is neces-
sary for learning from one's own experiences. In many contexts, the sensory system and memory 
do not give the individual much choice on the matter. The individual often is not able to avoid 
learning about and from failure, and recalling the bad experiences when a similar task comes up 
again is virtually automatic. Moreover, evaluation can be entrusted to technology and to outsid-
ers, if necessary even against the will of the individual, as in the case of tax auditors who are le-
gally mandated to check the accounting practices of companies. 
e) Problem  Solving  Modes 
In our model, problem solving modes link processing modules to task characteristics. Depending 
on the resources they muster, modules can meet different performance standards. Ideally, the 
problem solving mode exactly matches the requirements of the task. Conversely, it is the plural-
ity of task characteristics that explains the plurality of problem solving modes which, in turn, 
allows individuals to reach better decisions. Not being confined to the one cognitively-effortful 
all-purpose analytic tool suggested by the rational-economic model empowers individuals to 
save internal and external resources, which increases their overall problem solving capacity. 
Strictly speaking, these considerations are not sufficient to justify problem solving modes as a 
separate component of the model. It would be enough to directly link specific processing mod-
ules to task characteristics. Problem solving modes are a necessary model component, however, 
if the normal decision how to decide does not directly match modules to task characteristics, but 
is confined to choosing among preconfigured problem solving modes, which is precisely our 
claim. While novel problem solving modes can be made up on the spot and from scratch, engag-
ing the individual in the full analytic deliberation of rational-economic man, this is probably an 
exception. Instead, most people most of the time can be expected to engage in some matching of 
existing, tried-and-true problem solving modes to the presenting task and available resources and 
to engage in the problem solving mode that provides the best match.    10
The metaphor of the mental tool box is telling. When one wants to hang a painting, one selects a 
hammer and a nail. Only in extraordinary circumstances would one start to construct a new tool. 
Likewise, when facing a decision task, individuals typically check the problem solving modes 
available to them. Only in exceptional situations will they try to forge a new problem solving 
mode. When individuals decide how to decide, the default is choosing the most appropriate pre-
configured problem solving mode, given the characteristics of the task. 
Relying on preconfigured problem solving modes saves mental and external resources. The deci-
sion how to decide reduces to a mere matching task, where the domain of the task at hand is 
matched against the domains in which existing problem solving modes have performed well. 
This presentation of the issue invites the classification of problem solving modes as skills 
(Anderson 2000:chapter 9). A skill is a chain of mental and physical modules that are chunked 
together. The skill is stored in memory as just one unit. If it is retrieved, it unrolls in its entirety. 
To a large extent, this is indeed true of problem solving modes.  They are learned and acquired 
with experience, rather than being innate. Moreover, not all individuals hold the same problem 
solving modes in their mental tool boxes.  
The contents of the box depends on the individual decision-making and problem solving history. 
Professional deformation is an obvious illustration. A trained economist has a proclivity to see 
strategic interaction everywhere. This may induce her to use her game-theoretical reasoning 
skills for decision-making where others would have relied on intuition. More importantly, to the 
extent that problem solving modes are skills, the individual can learn how to make better deci-
sions. Specifically, when our economist learns through evaluation and feedback that the per-
formance of her chosen problem solving mode was poor, she has one of two options. She can 
switch to a different problem solving mode in future instances, in which case she has learnt 
something about the proper domain of the problem solving mode. Alternatively, the bad experi-
ence may help her to modify the chosen problem solving mode in some way to improve its per-
formance in future applications.  
No craftsman has an unlimited number of tools. Likewise the number of problem solving modes 
to which a given individual has access is probably limited, even though there is no abstract 
bound to the number of problem solving modes which human decision makers may have at their 
disposition.  When task characteristics change over time or technological or institutional innova-
tions provide new opportunities, human creativity will generate more appropriate problem solv-
ing modes.  
Table 2 illustrates the concept of a preconfigured problem solving mode with its different stages 
by four examples from different content domains. The examples range from utmost simplicity 
(responding to a fire alarm in a building) to high complexity (responding to a fire as a member of 
a fire brigade). The reaction to a fire alarm should be almost automatic. Selling land should be a 
deliberate affair. The other two examples of problem solving modes are meant to combine delib-
erate with intuitive components. While the first two problem solving modes do not involve 
evaluation, it is crucial in the other two cases. The modes for responding to a fire alarm and for   11
selling land a fairly fixed, while the modes for driving and for a fire brigade are highly plastic. 
While the mode for selling land heavily relies on external resources, those are at most secondary 
in the reaction to a fire alarm, and in driving behaviour.  
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adjust driving  
to weather  
conditions 
manipulate car  permanently 
readjust to  
traffic situation 
fire brigade  1. save lives 
2. fight fire 
1. extinguish 
2. prevent from 
spreading 
•  water or foam? 
• access  from 
 within  the 
 building? 










Problem Solving Modes: Illustrations 
 
f)  Choice Among Problem Solving Modes 
The plurality of problem solving modes gives humans a rich set of options for solving problems, 
often with less effort than required by an exhaustive analysis, but could also be seen as adding to 
the decision load, as resources must be invested into the metadecision among problem solving 
modes. It is not likely, however, that the brain goes through complex calculations for each and 
every of the many metadecisions of how to decide that an individual takes on a day. Instead, we 
hypothesize that the decision how to decide is usually taken by default. 
The basic idea is culled from a model of heuristic decision-making developed by (Engel 2006). 













Choice Among Preconfigured Problem Solving Modes 
 
The model states that the information about the task and the environment is processed according 
to an ex ante defined decision rule that maps input conditions to problem solving modes. Spe-
cifically, if the definitional cues that the meta-rule specifies for a problem solving mode are pre-
sent, the corresponding mode is applied. When selecting the problem solving mode, the individ-
ual thus does not check whether this mode is in line with her goals. This is not to say that goals 
were irrelevant for this choice, but that, in the concrete meta-choice, the check against the goals 
has been incorporated and reduced to a mere matching exercise, where the goal component has 
been replaced by a “domain” component.  For a predetermined problem-solving mode to be ap-
plied, not only its definitional cues must be found in the input provided by the task environment, 
but other features of the situation must also point to the applicability of the problem solving 
mode. While the cues are definitional, the domain is described in a less precise way. The descrip-
tion could be by exemplars (Anderson 2000:350-352) or, more likely, by schemas (Bartlett 
1932:199-204; Goldstein and Weber 1997:598) (also see Schlicht 1998:chapter 7 on rules based 
on schemas) or by scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977). For instance, before overtaking, the driver 
would check whether this is ordinary traffic. The schema for “ordinary” traffic might encompass: 
Am I on the motorway? Are there two or more lanes on the street? Can I look ahead more than 
100 yards? Is there no rain or ice on the road? Is there little traffic? Do I know the street? Am I 
not tired? Not all, but a sufficient number of these questions would have to be answered in the   13
positive. If so, the two definitional cues would be: is there traffic on the opposing lane? Are oth-
ers overtaking at the same time? If both are answered in the negative, the driver would apply her 
overtaking routines, regulating all the necessary mental and motor activity. 
Consequently, all the individual has to do when faced with a decision task is checking for de-
scriptions of domains stored in memory. If such a description is found, she determines the prob-
lem solving mode without further ado. There is thus no weighing of pros and cons of different 
problem solving modes in the concrete decision situation. Specifically, such weighing is only 
undertaken if the individual has not previously settled down for tackling a certain class of tasks 
by a certain problem solving mode. However, if no appropriate problem solving mode emerges 
by this matching process, we assume the default mode for choosing among problem solving 
modes to be some analytic form of weighing arguments. This need not necessarily be done con-
sciously, however. Emotions might also play a role in this.  
4.  Access Points for Institutions 
The purpose of our model has been to map out the access points for institutional intervention. In 
principle, intervention may affect the use of an internal or external resource and the selection of a 
specific version of different processing module(s) or of an entire problem solving mode. 
Thereby, institutional intervention may in principle impact on every element of the problem 
solving cycle.  
a)  Illustrations from Institutional Practice 
It is relatively easy for institutions to make additional external resources available for the prob-
lem solving activities of their addressees. For instance, anti-discrimination legislation obliges 
employers to keep records. That way, universities become aware of the fact that many more 
women graduate than start an academic career, and many more become assistant professors than 
get tenure. The intervention matters since statistics outperform intuition (Meadow and Sunstein 
2001). Institutions may also impose the assistance of experts. For instance, house owners in 
some countries are not allowed to maintain their chimneys, but have to engage the services of a 
professional chimney sweeper. Access to internal resources is less easily influenced from the 
outside, but skill building is one way to do so. Regular fire drills provide an illustration. They are 
meant to inscribe a script in people's memories, which would unroll almost automatically in an 
emergency situation.  
Other institutions provide their addressees with the content of entire processing modules. Take 
another precautionary measure, the posting of standardised signs for emergency exits, as an ex-
ample for an institution offering a module for input. Due to the signs, individuals have no need 
for orientation. Should an emergency break out, they just follow the green signs. Likewise, insti-
tutions may impact on the module for output. For instance, safety legislation specifies that elec-
tric hedge shears have to be designed in such a way that they can only be handled with two   14
hands. This reduces the risk that the gardener negligently injures herself or a bystander. Another 
piece of legislation makes long checklists mandatory in aircraft maintenance. Such lists make 
sure that all the safety relevant information is properly processed. Much of criminal law can be 
read as an attempt at influencing the goal module. Individuals are threatened with severe sanc-
tions if they let feelings like vengeance or avidity gain the upper hand. Finally, institutions may 
impose an evaluation and feedback module. This is, for instance, part of Eco management and 
audit schemes (EC OJ 2001 L 114/1). 
Institutions can influence all elements of the problem solving cycle. The siren of the ambulance 
is a tool for changing other drivers’ task selection. They no longer concentrate on reaching their 
destination, but drive to the shoulder. A good example for the impact of institutions on task con-
struction stems from waste management legislation. This legislation serves two purposes: to pro-
tect the environment from emissions on the waste path, and to reduce the use of natural re-
sources. Both purposes are best served if products are designed in a waste friendly manner. Ide-
ally, producers should thus construct their task in research and development differently. Legisla-
tion tries to bring this result about by obliging producers to take their products back at the end of 
the product cycle.  
There are two strategies for institutions to change how their addressees define the solution. The 
easier strategy aims at reducing the choice set. Take waste management again. Through advertis-
ing campaigns, environmental agencies have tried to establish the social norm “do not litter.”  
Adding a normatively more desirable course of action to the individual's choice set is more de-
manding. But in some countries, waste management authorities have indeed educated households 
to separate waste into fractions, like paper or plastics. 
Institutions frequently impact on the execution of tasks. Again a negative strategy may be distin-
guished from a positive one. Internal sovereignty implies that government has a monopoly on the 
exercise of physical power. For ordinary citizens, this excludes a large set of technologies for 
executing their decisions. Conversely, fire fighters are trained to go into burning buildings, 
which others could only do at a much greater risk for life and limb. Finally, institutions may im-
pose evaluation. This is, for instance, done if the university president makes student evaluation 
of courses and professors mandatory.  
Regularly, however, institutions do not only try to modify the resources or processing modules 
used for problem solving, or individual elements of the problem solving cycle. Instead, their goal 
is to endow their addressees with entire new problem solving modes, or to modify their choice 
among existing problem solving modes.  
Many institutions serve as rationalisers. They shift problem solving to the careful and deliberate 
weighing of pros and cons. Many have observed that markets have this effect (see only Becker 
1962; Plott 1986). The most important effect of transferring interaction to a market is motiva-
tional. Acting on a market visibly raises stakes (Smith 1989; Smith 1991; Smith 1994). Markets 
also shape motivation. Strong pro-social motivation is not likely to survive (Hoffman and Spitzer   15
1985). But in markets, outright selfishness or even irrational anti-social behaviour does not pay 
either. Markets therefore also serve as training grounds for the basic rules of social interaction 
(Henrich and Boyd 2005; Jankowiak 2005). The cognitive effects of markets do result from the 
fact that transactions happen on a formally or informally organised market (Engel and Schweizer 
2002). The institutional framework thus helps market participants build mutual expectations. 
Other institutions aim at routinisation. Professionalisation does exactly this (Gehlen 1960:71; 
Goldstein and Hogarth 1997:29). It is a rich institutional arrangement. Its most important formal 
component is a legal barrier to market entry. More and more professions have come under this 
regime. Being a doctor, a dispensing chemist, an architect, a structural engineer, an attorney or a 
notary public requires formal admission. The admission requirement makes it possible to impose 
formal training on future professionals. Moreover, many professions are organised into cham-
bers. This brings professionals under the purview of a formally organised peer group (Battaglini, 
Benabou et al. 2002). Both training and peer group control allow for a dense net of informal 
rules, dos and don’ts and standards of best practise. Moreover, within professions, social status is 
closely linked to obedience to these rules, and to participation in their implementation.  
Yet other institutions bring about automatisation. The driving school example from the introduc-
tion fits here. The very purpose of this intervention is to endow future drivers with a whole set of 
very simple decision rules. Stop when the traffic light turns red. Slow down when it starts to rain. 
Check the mirror before overtaking another car. 
b)  Implications for Institutional Design 
Not all institutions are designed. Neither social norms nor customary law are the direct result of 
purposeful intervention. Yet many institutions are indeed introduced with a very precise purpose 
in mind. Suppose the designer pursues an ultimate goal that would be best served by changing 
how the addressees decide to decide. How could this designer bring the change about? The an-
swer largely depends on a further question: does the designer have time, or must she attain the 
ultimate goal by this one intervention, i.e., ad hoc? At this point, the policy relevance of our 
main claim becomes visible. Since problem solving modes are typically preconfigured, ad hoc 
interventions will usually not be able to directly target a resource, a module or an element from 
the problem solving cycle. If intervention is, or must be, ad hoc, it usually is confined to target-
ing the choice among preconfigured problem solving modes. 
If the public is scandalised by a social ill, the media may demand that penalties be raised. This is 
a way of visibly raising stakes. Higher stakes focus self-critical attention to the decision-making 
process (Arkes 1991). They induce people to prepare more intensely (Tetlock 1983a), to be more 
open to facts (Lerner, Goldberg et al. 1998), to take more of the available information into ac-
count (Tetlock 1983b; Tetlock and Boettger 1989) and to show greater internal consistency 
(Hagafors and Brehmer 1983; Ashton 1992). All these effects at the level of behaviour can be 
traced back to the fact that higher stakes make addressees switch to deliberate reasoning as the 
problem solving mode. A justification requirement has a similar effect. Cognitively, justification   16
makes the individual aware of the actual complexity of the task (Cvetkovich 1978; Hagafors and 
Brehmer 1983; Weldon and Gargano 1988). Motivationally, the justification requirement makes 
accountability salient (Hagafors and Brehmer 1983). 
Deliberate reasoning is, however, not the only and often perhaps not the best problem solving 
mode that can be triggered when immediate intervention is required. In experiments, psycholo-
gists often induce participants to use different decision modes by such manipulations as time 
pressure (e.g. Maule, Hockey et al. 2000) or distraction by multitasking (e.g. Bishop 2001). Insti-
tutional intervention can learn from these examples that it is possible to change the situation such 
that addressees match the task with another preconfigured problem solving mode. 
Immediate intervention can also exploit the fact that most problem solving modes are skills. 
Skills are domain specific. Skills are stored in memory as procedural knowledge.  This means 
that institutions can target recall from memory. Memory recall is guided by two factors: its base 
rate of activation, and the recency of previous recall (Anderson 2000:chapter 8). The latter is 
open to ad hoc intervention. As research on priming demonstrates, previous activation of a fact 
or a skill makes its subsequent recall and use more likely.  Previous activation does not need to 
target precisely the same item whose subsequent privileged recall is desired, as memory activa-
tion spreads in a network like manner (Collins and Loftus 1975).  
It is not always necessary for institutions to change behaviour ad hoc. Long-term intervention is 
acceptable if it is sufficient to change a long-term behavioural trend. This presupposes that soci-
ety tolerates temporary deviations from the social optimum. Under these more favourable condi-
tions, institutional designers may pursue one of two strategies. The more profound strategy aims 
at endowing addressees with additional problem solving modes. The less profound strategy in-
creases the availability of a previously existing problem solving mode in a new area. 
In the interest of reaching these long-term goals, interventions may be more or less direct. The 
most direct intervention is imposed training, as in driving school or in the obligation to go to pro-
fessional schools. A more indirect strategy is applicable if the addressees have the desired prob-
lem solving mode in their tool box, but do not employ it to the socially desired degree. A practi-
cally important case are problem solving modes with a pronounced intuitive component, as per-
ceived accountability induces individuals to work harder, but not necessarily smarter (Payne, 
Bettman et al. 1988:200).  As a result, decision quality improves for standard tasks, but may de-
teriorate for unusual tasks (Pelham and Neter 1995:582; Hogarth, Gibbs et al. 1997:247-249). 
Subjects become more likely to exhibit dominant responses (Lerner and Tetlock 1999:259). They 
focus on what they are good at (Hogarth, Gibbs et al. 1997:247). In such a situation, institutional 
intervention must help addressees build trust in the power of their intuitions. To than end, institu-
tions often shield addressees from potentially negative consequences of their action. The busi-
ness judgement rule from corporate law (Greenfield and Nilsson 1997) can be brought under this 
rubric, as well as rules that shelter public officials from personal responsibility, or rules that pro-
hibit court intervention into matrimonial affairs, and in the education of children by their parents.   17
Going back to the examples from Table 2, Table 3 summarizes the access points and the most 
important elements of the respective institutional arrangements. 
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Our paper has attempted to make the following argument. In many contexts, institutions are not 
confined to just changing behaviour; instead they can and should attempt to control and modify 
the way in which decisions are made and implemented. This is a demanding, but not an impossi-
ble goal. Institutions have a number of access points available to them for this purpose. Specifi-
cally, institutions may pursue two different strategies. For ad hoc interventions, they may modify 
the task environment in ways that trigger a different preconfigured problem solving mode. On a 
longer-term basis, they may increase the repertoire of problem solving modes available to ad-
dressees, and they may change the likelihood that specific problem solving modes are used.  
Our conceptual model of the way in which individuals solve problems and make decisions is 
intended to show that institutions are not restricted to affect only available resources, processing 
modules, or specific elements of the problem solving cycle.  We argue that the easiest access 
point for institutional intervention is the meta-selection of an entire problem solving mode.  As 
problem solving modes typically are domain-specific acquired skills that muster appropriate re-
sources in light of task characteristics, institutional interventions should aim to modify the task 
environment in ways that will increase selection of a socially more desirable mode or to invest in 
the establishment and automatisation of new problem solving modes in situations where socially 
desirable modes are not part of people’s cognitive tool box.   
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